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I. INTRODUCTION
Eliminating discrimination is undoubtedly a central concern of
contemporary constitutional law, but one must not lose sight of the
fact that the Constitution does not prohibit discrimination by parties
who are not state actors. Acts of discrimination by people who are not
state actors may, in fact, be entitled to constitutional protection.
Claims of this "right to discriminate" arise quite frequently in the con-
text of challenges to so-called "public accommodation statutes."'i The
application of a public accommodation statute against a group that is
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAw REVIEW
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ber Nebraska Law Review; Order of the Coif. The author wishes to express sin-
cere appreciation to Professor Rick Duncan for his time and thoughts which
significantly contributed to the preparation of this article. Furthermore, the au-
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1. See, e.g., NEB. REv. STAT. § 20-132 (Reissue 1997) ("All persons within this state
shall be entitled to a fifll and equal enjoyment of any place of public accommoda-
tion .... without discrimination or segregation on the grounds of race, color, sex,
religion, national origin, or ancestry."). Despite the absence in § 20-132 of the
express protection against discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation, the
possibility that such an argument may soon be made looms on the horizon be-
cause of the recent addition of an equal protection clause to the Nebraska
Constitution.
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inherently expressive in nature could quite possibly infringe upon that
group's constitutionally protected freedom of "expressive
association."2
The constitutionality of applying anti-discrimination legislation to
all organizations classified by a state as "public," such as the Boy
Scouts in New Jersey, is by no means settled. The United States
Supreme Court has been confronted with the constitutionality of such
statutes on three occasions: Roberts v. United States Jaycees;3 Board
of Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary Club;4 and New York
State Club Ass'n v. City of New York.5 In all three cases the Court
refused to establish a per se rule. A careful reading of these opinions
indicates that invocation of accommodation statutes will not be al-
lowed to be used to pry open the door to all clubs that solicit member-
ship from the general public. Rather, such statutes are unlikely to be
upheld if applied to a situation in which the government has not
shown a compelling interest for infringement of the group's right of
expressive association.
This article explains how these three cases, which comprise the
"Roberts trilogy," illuminate the analytical framework for evaluating a
claim of "freedom of expressive association" when a club attempts to
invoke the right to discriminate in order to be selective in accepting
members. The first step of analysis, determining the type of associa-
tion, originates in the Roberts opinion. Writing for the Court in Rob-
erts, Justice Brennan recognized two classes of the right of
association: intimate association and expressive association. Most
large organizations may still wish to be selective, but will probably not
fall within the "intimate association"6 exemption. An avenue, and
quite possibly the only avenue, through which such groups may be
able to avoid being forced to accept members they wish to exclude,
therefore, is through the "expressive association" exemption. 7 Under
this exemption, the controlling factor in the Court's analysis appears
to be the group's objective or purpose. The second step of the analysis
more closely examines the group's purpose, to determine whether that
purpose is tied to traditionally protected First Amendment rights, or if
the purpose would be significantly impaired by forcing non-discrimi-
2. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984). This "right of
association" was first recognized by the United States Supreme Court in NAACP
v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958), in which the Court reasoned that
"[elffective advocacy of both public and private points of view ... is undeniably
enhanced by group association, as this Court has more than once recognized by
remarking upon the close nexus between freedoms of speech and assembly."
3. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
4. 481 U.S. 537 (1987).
5. 487 U.S. 1 (1988).
6. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 621.
7. Id. at 622
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nation. If the group's purpose is so tied to First Amendment freedoms,
the group may be exempt from the public accommodations law. On
the other hand, the state may nonetheless be able to justify infringe-
ment upon the group's constitutional rights in the event that the state
can articulate a compelling interest that the state is attempting to
protect by way of the infringement.
Through the lens of Dale v. Boy Scouts of America,s this article will
attempt to show that, in light of the Roberts trilogy, the application of
public accommodation laws against a group such as the Boy Scouts is
an unconstitutional infringement of the group's right of "expressive
association." In addition to disregarding the Boy Scouts' right of ex-
pressive association, an application of such statutes may also violate
free speech principles embodied within the First Amendment. The
Dale Courts concluded that the Boy Scouts was a public accommoda-
tion within the ambit of New Jersey's public accommodation statute.9
Whether this is a correct application of the statute, as it has been in-
terpreted by that state's highest court, I leave for another day.
The focus of this article is the erroneous ruling of the New Jersey
Supreme Court in holding that the State of New Jersey had a "compel-
ling interest in eliminating discrimination based on sexual orienta-
tion"1O sufficient to justify infringement of the Boy Scouts' right of
"expressive association" as recognized by the Supreme Court in Rob-
erts. An analysis of how the New Jersey Supreme Court erred in its
application of the statute against the Boy Scouts follows an observa-
tion of the background of the right of "expressive association" as it
currently stands, as well as a brief examination of the facts in Dale.
The analysis will submit that not only did the Dale Courts unconstitu-
tionally infringe the rights of expressive association belonging to the
Boy Scouts, but the decisions infringed upon the Boy Scouts' free
speech rights as well. In reaching their conclusions, the Dale Courts
also misapplied the "compelling interest" analysis in finding that the
state of New Jersey had sufficient justification for infringement of
those rights. The article concludes with a brief forecast of what is to
come should states seek to "overapply" public accommodation statutes
to groups such as the Boy Scouts of America.
8. 706 A.2d 270 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998), affd, 734 A.2d 1196 (N.J. 1999),
and petition for cert. filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3292 (U.S. Oct. 25, 1999) (No. 99-699).
Shortly before this article went to press, the U.S. Supreme Court granted cert
to Dale. See Dale v. Boy Scouts of America, No. 99-699, 2000 WL 21144 (U.S.
Jan. 14, 2000).
9. See Dale v. Boy Scouts of America, 734 A.2d 1196 (N.J. 1999), petition for cert.
filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3292 (U.S. Oct. 25, 1999) (No. 99-699).
10. Id. at 1228.
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I. BACKGROUND OF THE RIGHT OF EXPRESSIVE
ASSOCIATION: THE "ROBERTS TRILOGY"
The United State Supreme Court has clearly recognized that col-
lective expression is a right protected by the Constitution. Specifi-
cally, the Court has held that the First Amendment protects the "right
to associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social,
economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends.""1 The Court has
also noted that "[tihe freedom to associate applies to the beliefs we
share, and to those we consider reprehensible."12 Furthermore, the
freedom to associate with certain individuals "plainly presupposes a
freedom not to associate" with other persons.13 This freedom "not to
associate" is at the heart of the controversy in cases such as Dale, in
which groups are seeking to invoke their "right to discriminate."
The Court's initial foray into the constitutional difficulties inherent
in cases such as Dale took place in Roberts v. United States Jaycees.14
Roberts forced the Court to confront the constitutional difficulties
raised by applying anti-discrimination legislation to private organiza-
tions. The issue confronting the Roberts Court was whether the State
of Minnesota could apply its public accommodations law to the
Jaycees and compel the Jaycees to admit women to "full member sta-
tus."15 The Supreme Court held that the state was justified in forcing
the Jaycees to do so, despite invocation of the First Amendment by the
Jaycees.16
Roberts employed a balancing test, balancing the State's interest in
eliminating discrimination based on gender against the Jaycees' pur-
ported "right to discriminate" via a selective membership policy.17
Before actually applying the balancing test, Justice Brennan correctly
recognized that the "decisions have referred to constitutionally pro-
tected 'freedom of association' in two distinct senses."L8 Brennan
pointed out that the first line of decisions dealt with peoples' decisions
to "enter into and maintain certain intimate human relationships,"
which he later tabbed the right of "intimate association."19 Realizing
that the right of intimate association was not at issue in Roberts,
Brennan then explained that the First Amendment also protects "a
right to associate for the purpose of engaging in those activities pro-
tected by the First Amendment-speech, assembly,... and exercise of
11. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984).
12. Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 575 (1974).
13. Id. at 623 (citing Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234-35 (1977)).
14. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
15. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 614.
16. See id. at 631.
17. See Ld. at 612.
18. Id. at 617.
19. Id.
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religion."20 Brennan labeled this aspect of the penumbral right "ex-
pressive association."2 1
Of the many possible forms governmental interference with free
association may take, one of the most troubling is interference with
the group's membership policies. The Roberts Court recognized that
by requiring the Jaycees to admit women as full voting members, the
state infringed the rights of the Jaycees in that the state was attempt-
ing to interfere with the internal organization or affairs of the group.2 2
Brennan appreciated the intrusion in Roberts, by pointing out that the
Minnesota law "may impair the ability of the original members to ex-
press only those views that brought them together."2 3 At one point in
his opinion, Brennan even went so far as to note that "[t]here can be
no clearer example of an intrusion into the internal structure or af-
fairs of an association than a regulation that forces the group to accept
members it does not desire."2 4 Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion
classified such a threat as an even larger one, writing "[pirotection of
the association's rights to define its membership derives from the rec-
ognition that the formation of an expressive association is the creation
of a voice, and the selection of members is the definition of that
voice."2 5
Justice O'Connor urged the Court to recognize a distinction based
on whether the group was formed predominately for expressive pur-
poses or for commercial purposes. She would have provided more pro-
tection for the former and less protection for the latter.2 6 Justice
O'Connor also provided, in her concurrence, what may have been a
premonition that application of these statutes to groups such as the
Boy Scouts may indeed go beyond violating the right of expressive as-
sociation. O'Connor correctly recognized that such statutes may also
violate the Free Speech rights of some groups to which the statutes
are applied. 27 Under either Brennan's or O'Connor's approach, how-
20. Id. at 618.
21. See id.
22. Id. at 623.
23. Id.
24. See id. at 623.
25. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 633 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
26. See id. at 637-38 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
27. Justice O'Connor provided in her concurrence that
[Aln association engaged exclusively in protected expression enjoys First
Amendment protection of both the content of its message and the choice
of its members. Protection of the message itself is judged by the same
standards as protection of speech by an individual. Protection of the as-
sociation's right to define its membership derives from the recognition
that the formation of an expressive association is the creation of a voice,
and the selection of members is the definition of that voice.
Id. at 633 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
[Vol. 78:644
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ever, at least one thing is clear; in certain instances, a right of expres-
sive association will be protected.
The Court qualified its recognition of the right of "expressive asso-
ciation," by noting that "[tihe right to associate for expressive pur-
poses is not . . . absolute."28 The Court continued by noting
"[i]nfringements on that right may be justified by regulations adopted
to serve compelling state interests, unrelated to the suppression of
ideas, that cannot be achieved through means significantly less re-
strictive of associational freedoms."2 9 The Court concluded that Min-
nesota's compelling interest in "eradicating discrimination against its
female citizens justifies the impact that application of the statute to
the Jaycees may have on... associational freedoms."30 The Roberts
Court noted that the Jaycees failed to demonstrate that the statute
imposed any serious burdens on the freedoms of expressive associa-
tion because the statute did not require the organization to change its
creed, did not alter any symbolic message of the organization, and did
not impose restrictions on the organization's ability to exclude individ-
uals with ideologies or philosophies differing from those of existing
members.31 Application of the statute at issue in Roberts only re-
quired that female citizens be treated the same as male citizens as far
as membership status within the group. Application of the statute to
the Jaycees would not affect any First Amendment rights of the
Jaycees in such a manner and to such an extent that the selective
membership policy resulting in discrimination against women might
be justified.
Holding that any infringement upon the right of expressive associ-
ation in Roberts was justified by a compelling interest, the Court did
not provide a definitive answer as to how to recognize valid invoca-
tions of that right. The Court, however, did take time to note "factors
that may be relevant" to such a determination.32 Roberts did not hint
at the relative importance of any one factor nor did it indicate whether
the list of possibly relevant factors is exclusive, noting only that other
factors "may be pertinent" in a particular case. Basically, the ap-
proach taken by the Court in Roberts leaves the Court with plenary
28. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623.
29. Id
30. Id. (emphasis added).
31. See id. at 627.
32. Id. at 620. Justice Brennan wrote that each case would require careful assess-
ment of where the particular association is located on a spectrum from the most
intimate, to the most attenuated of personal attachments. "We need not mark
the potentially significant points on this terrain with any precision. We note only
that factors that may be relevant include size, purpose, policies, selectivity, con-
geniality, and other characteristics that in a particular case may be pertinent."
Id. (emphasis added).
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authority to determine, on an ad hoc basis, what associations will be
accorded constitutional protection. 33
Only three years after the Roberts decision, the Court was once
again confronted with the issue of whether a public accommodations
law could constitutionally infringe upon the freedom of expressive as-
sociation. This second lawsuit, involving the Rotary Club, was
brought pursuant to language in Brennan's opinion that suggested
that a group much smaller than the Jaycees, such as the Kiwanis,
might be entitled to more protection.3 4 In Board of Directors of Rotary
International v. Rotary Club,35 the Court was asked to strike down a
California statute that required the Rotary Clubs to admit women. As
in Roberts, the Court indicated that there was no evidence indicating
that if forced to admit women, the Rotary Club would be affected in a
significant way and would be thwarted in their attempt to "carry out
their various purposes."3 6 The Court once again held that the state
had a compelling interest in eradicating discrimination against wo-
men. Consequently, if there was any infringement on the rights of
expressive association of the Rotary Club by forcing them to admit
women, the incidental infringement was justified by this compelling
interest.37 Rotary was the Court's way of reiterating that constitu-
tional protection of selective membership practices would only be war-
ranted if a group's purpose is tied to the advancement of beliefs and
ideas that might be significantly disrupted if forced to adhere to the
non-discrimination statute or if forced to implement non-discrimina-
tory membership policies. As applied to the Jaycees or the Rotary
Club, the outcome of a case under such a balancing test is clear be-
cause the Club's purpose will not be inhibited when forced to comply
with the public accommodation statute. In other words, the Roberts
balancing test is tipped clearly in favor of protecting women from un-
founded discrimination. However, the outcome should be just as clear
when applied to a group such as the Boy Scouts of America and the
balance is just as clearly tipped in favor of its interests.
The final decision in the Roberts trilogy is New York State Club
Ass'n v. City of New York,38 decided only a year after Rotary. In New
33. See generally Neal E. Devins, The Trouble with Jaycees, 34 CATH. U. L. REv. 901
(1985).
34. Brennan noted that the distinction drawn by the Minnesota Supreme Court be-
tween the Kiwanis and the Jaycees was enough to dispose of the Jaycees' conten-
tion that the statute was overbroad. Brennan also noted that lower court's
reference to the Kiwanis Club was merely an illustrative reference to the "pri-
vate" prong of the test. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 630
(1984).
35. 481 U.S. 537 (1987).
36. Rotary, 481 U.S. at 548.
37. See id. at 549.
38. 487 U.S. 1 (1988).
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York State Club Ass'n, the Court was urged to declare a local ordi-
nance that compelled private athletic clubs and restaurants to allow
access to individuals who were members of protected classes facially
invalid because it violated the freedom of expressive association. The
Court, per Justice White, declined to do so because the ordinance on
its face "did not require the clubs to 'abandon or alter' any activities
protected by the First Amendment."3 9 In upholding the statute as
facially valid, the Court qualified its opinion by noting that it was
conceivable ... that an association might be able to show that it is organized
for specific expressive purposes and that it will not be able to advocate its
desired viewpoints nearly as effectively if it cannot confine its membership to
those who share the same sex, for example, or the same religion.4 0
After New York State Club Ass'n, the Court seemed not only to
have left the door open for a group such as the Boy Scouts, but at the
same time seemed to send such a group nothing short of a written
invitation to the "expressive association" party. Unfortunately, the
New Jersey Supreme Court in Dale saw fit to be the doorman at the
United States Supreme Court's party, and turned the Boy Scouts
away by overgeneralizing statements the Court had made throughout
the Roberts trilogy. Furthermore, the Dale Court relied upon proposi-
tions never before employed by the United States Supreme Court to
override the Boy Scouts' freedom of expressive association, as well as
their freedom of speech.
HI. DALE V. BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA: THE (MIS)
APPLICATION OF THE ANTI-DISCRIMINATION
STATUTE AGAINST BOY SCOUTS
The decision in Dale dealt with the revocation by the Boy Scouts of
America of James Dale's application to become a Boy Scout Leader
and to maintain his adult membership. After becoming aware that
Dale was a leader in a local homosexual organization, the Boy Scouts
revoked his adult registration, thereby precluding any possibility of
his ever becoming a voluntary Scoutmaster. 4 1 The Boy Scouts
claimed that membership as a leader in the organization was a privi-
lege, and that homosexuality was contrary to the beliefs of the organi-
zation.42 In its revocation of Dale's membership, the Boy Scouts relied
upon internal policy statements dating back as far as March 17, 1978,
in which the organization declared that "an individual who openly de-
clares himself to be a homosexual would not be selected as a volunteer
39. New York State Club Ass'n, 487 U.S. at 13.
40. Id.
41. See Dale v. Boy Scouts of America, 706 A.2d 270, 275-76 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1998), affd, 734 A.2d 1196 (N.J. 1999), and petition for cert. filed, 68
U.S.L.W. 3292 (U.S. Oct. 25, 1999) (No. 99-699).
42. See id. at 275.
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Scout leader."4 3 According to the National Boy Scouts of America, the
"requirements that a scout be 'morally straight' and 'clean' are incon-
sistent with homosexuality."44 The Boy Scouts also relied upon writ-
ten declarations by the organization that leaders were viewed as role
models for younger scouts and that it did not want to hire leaders who
continue to interpret the Scout Oath or Law differently than the or-
ganization itself.45
Both Dale Courts acknowledged the importance of the Boy Scouts'
policies. These written policies were acknowledged by the inferior ap-
pellate court when it acknowledged that the 1972 Scoutmaster's
Handbook emphasized the leader's duty as a role model. The court
recognized that the leaders' role was to provide a good example of
what a man should be like. The Scoutmaster Handbook also stated
that "[wihat you do and what you are may be worth a thousand lec-
tures and sermons."4 6 The appellate court continued, quoting from
the Scoutmaster Handbook, "[wihat you are speaks louder than what
you say. This ranges from simple things like wearing a uniform to the
matter of your behavior as an individual. Boys need a model to copy
and you might be the only good example they know."4 7 Furthermore, it
was acknowledged by the New Jersey Supreme Court that the "Boy
Scouts' activities are designed to build character and instill moral
principles."48 However, the existence of those policies did not prevent
James Dale from pursuing reinstatement of his membership. 4 9
Dale claimed that the denial of his membership application vio-
lated the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination.50 The Boy Scouts
countered that it would be unconstitutional to apply the law against
them because it would infringe their rights of expressive association
43. Id. at 276.
44. Id.; see also Dale v. Boy Scouts of America, 734 A.2d 1196, 1224 (N.J. 1999), peti-
tion for cert. filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3292 (U.S. Oct. 25, 1999) (No. 99-699).
45. See Dale v. Boy Scouts of America, 706 A.2d 270, 276 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1998); see also Dale v. Boy Scouts of America, 734 A-2d 1196, 1205 n.4, & 1224
n.12 (N.J. 1999), petition for cert. filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3292 (U.S. Oct. 25, 1999) (No.
99-699).
46. Dale v. Boy Scouts of America, 706 A.2d 270, 276 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998),
affd, 734 A.2d 1196 (N.J. 1999), and petition for cert. filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3292
(U.S. Oct. 25, 1999) (No. 99-699).
47. Id. at 276 (emphasis supplied).
48. Dale v. Boy Scouts of America, 734 A.2d 1196, 1228 (N.J. 1999), petition for cert.
filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3292 (U.S. Oct. 25, 1999) (No. 99-699).
49. The Scoutmaster Handbook, which Dale would be asked to comply with as a
Scoutmaster, cautions leaders to avoid inconsistencies between their statements
and actions: "practice what you preach .... The most destructive influence on
boys is adult inconsistency and hypocrisy." See Petition for Certiorari at 3, Dale
v. Boy Scouts of America, (U.S. Oct. 25, 1999) (No. 99-699).
50. See Dale v. Boy Scouts of America, 734 A.2d 1196, 1205 (N.J. 1999), petition for
cert. filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3292 (U.S. Oct. 25, 1999) (No. 99-699).
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and free speech. 51 The New Jersey Appellate Court accepted certain
factual assertions of the Boy Scouts, taking issue with the proposition
that the application of the statute would impair its ability to exercise
freedoms protected by the First Amendment.52 Nevertheless, the ap-
pellate court indicated that while the right of expressive association
may be violated by applying the law against the Boy Scouts, the in-
fringement was justified by the state's compelling interest in "eradi-
cating discrimination."5 3 The New Jersey Supreme Court agreed,
noting that "even if Dale's membership 'works some slight infringe-
ment on... [the Boy Scouts'] members' right of expressive associa-
tion,' we find that the 'infringement is justified because it serves...
[New Jersey's] compelling interest in eliminating discrimination'
based on sexual orientation."5 4 About the only aspect of the case the
New Jersey Court correctly decided was that it delineated the proper
balancing test to be applied, that is, the compelling interest the state
urged upon the court compared to the club's right of expressive associ-
ation.5 5 However, in its application of that test, the Dale Courts gave
the compelling interest analysis a new look, and made freedom of ex-
pressive association basically non-existent in New Jersey as a defense
to applications of the public accommodations statute.
A. Infringement of Boy Scouts' Right of Expressive
Association and Free Speech
In Dale, the Boy Scouts argued that its selective membership and
leadership policies were protected as part of their constitutional right
of freedom of expressive association.5 6 Its argument was essentially,
as referred to previously, that they had a constitutional "right to dis-
criminate" by implementing a selective membership policy. The Boy
Scouts thought that it should be able to admit only those individuals
who would follow the organization's policies, or at a minimum, not ac-
tively protest the positions taken by the organization on controversial
issues such as homosexuality.5 7 As indicated by the background of
51. See id. at 1206.
52. Dale v. Boy Scouts of America, 706 A.2d 270,287 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998),
afj'd, 734 A.2d 1196 (N.J. 1999), and petition for cert. filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3292
(U.S. Oct. 25, 1999) (No. 99-699).
53. See id.
54. Dale v. Boy Scouts of America, 734 A.2d 1196, 1228 (N.J. 1999) (citations omit-
ted), petition for cert. filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3292 (U.S. Oct. 25, 1999) (No. 99-699).
55. See id. at 1223.
56. See Dale v. Boy Scouts of America, 734 A.2d 1196, 1219 (N.J. 1999), petition for
cert. filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3292 (U.S. Oct. 25, 1999) (No. 99-699).
57. Dale testified at a deposition that the believes that homosexuality "is not im-
moral," and that while he was at college be became "deeply involved in gay rights
issues and maintained a high profile on campus." Petition for Certiorari at 6,
Dale v. Boy Scouts of America, (U.S. Oct. 25, 1999) (No. 99-699).
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the freedom of expressive association and the Roberts trilogy, how-
ever, there is an inherent conflict in cases such as Dale that involves
"two virtual first principles of contemporary constitutional law: free-
dom and equality. The right to choose one's associates (freedom) is
pitted against the right to equal treatment (equality), a most funda-
mental conflict."58 It follows that any resolution of the issue must
therefore turn on a combination of the Court's analysis in the Roberts
trilogy and the corresponding equality interests being violated by the
discriminatory associational policy. The latter is eventually protected
in cases such as Dale through the compelling interest aspect of the
Roberts balancing test.
The first inquiry that must be made in this type of case is just how
far the right of association will be stretched by the Court if faced with
the issue once again. In assessing such claims, one must keep in mind
that New York State Club Ass'n declared the statute involved therein
only facially valid. The Court left open the invitation for a club to
make a fact-based claim that it had the requisite distinctive character-
istics to claim expressive association protection.59 Despite the pattern
of the Roberts trilogy of restricting the right of expression of associa-
tion, the Court's language in New York State Club Ass'n "suggests that
the Court will go no further in restricting associational rights and may
possibly allow a more expansive" reading of associational freedom.60
Dale presents the Court with such an opportunity.
The Dale Courts held that it could not "convincingly be argued that
the Law Against Discrimination's proscription against discrimination
based upon 'affectional or sexual orientation' impedes [the Boy
Scouts'] ability to express its collective views on scouting, or to instill
in the scouts those qualities ... to which the Boy Scouts has tradition-
ally adhered."61 Having so limited the views the Boy Scouts were
seeking to protect, the Dale Courts then proceeded to ignore the real
question with which they were faced, and immediately framed the is-
sue as whether the Boy Scouts discriminated on the basis of sexual
orientation in violation of the Law Against Discrimination.62 In fram-
ing the issue this way, the New Jersey Appellate Court assumed that
the Boy Scouts' policy of excluding homosexuals from its leadership
58. William P. Marshall, Discrimination and the Right of Association, 81 Nw. U. L.
REv. 68, 69 (1986).
59. See New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 13 (1988).
60. Anthony L. Leto, New York State Club Association v. City of New York: Ending
Gender-Based Discrimination in Private Clubs-Are Associational Rights Still
Protected?, 16 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 623, 632 (1989).
61. Dale v. Boy Scouts of America, 706 A.2d 270, 288 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998),
affd, 734 A.2d 1196 (N.J. 1999), and petition for cert. filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3292
(U.S. Oct. 25, 1999) (No. 99-699).
62. See id. at 288-89; Dale v. Boy Scouts of America, 734 A.2d 1196, 1218 (N.J. 1999),
petition for cert. filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3292 (U.S. Oct. 25, 1999) (No. 99-699).
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ranks must be based on some "sinister and unspoken fear that gay
scout leaders will somehow cause physical or emotional injury to
scouts, or will instill in them ideas about the homosexual lifestyle,"6 3
and the New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that Dale's exclusion
"constituted discrimination based solely on his status as an openly gay
man."6 4 Both courts then proceeded to analyze the issue in terms of
having no evidence that the assumptions of the Boy Scouts were war-
ranted by empirical findings.
The Dale Courts "delivered a sermon about 'the human price of []
bigotry" 6 5 and overlooked the fact that Roberts involved the desire of
the Jaycees to exclude women as members. In Dale, the Boy Scouts
sought not to exclude merely a member, but to exclude an individual
possessing views opposite those held by the organization from holding
a leadership post within the organization.6 6 The New Jersey Supreme
Court even acknowledged that "protected expression may... take the
form of quiet persuasion, inculcation of traditional values, instruction
of the young,... [and] the training of outdoor survival skills or partici-
pation in community service might become expressive when the activ-
ity is intended to develop good morals, reverence, patriotism, and a
desire for self-improvement."6 7 The Court stated that "Boy Scouts ex-
presses a belief in moral values and uses its activities to encourage the
moral development of its members."6 8 Furthermore, "Boy Scouts' ac-
tivities are designed to build character and instill moral principles."6 9
Such revelations notwithstanding, the New Jersey Supreme Court
flatly stated that "the reinstatement of Dale does not compel Boy
Scouts to express any message."70 The problem with both courts'
analyses is, of course, that the only assumptions made in this case
were not made by the Boy Scouts, but by the courts themselves. The
policies of the Boy Scouts were not, as the Dale Courts assumed, seek-
ing to discriminate against all homosexuals in society. The Boy Scouts
only took the position that homosexuality was in direct contravention
63. Dale v. Boy Scouts of America, 706 A.2d 270,289 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998),
affd, 734 A.2d 1196 (N.J. 1999), and petition for cert. filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3292
(U.S. Oct. 25, 1999) (No. 99-699).
64. Dale v. Boy Scouts of America, 734 A.2d 1196, 1225 (N.J. 1999) (emphasis added),
petition for cert. filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3292 (U.S. Oct. 25, 1999) (No. 99-699).
65. Petition for Certiorari at 25, Dale v. Boy Scouts of America (U.S. Oct. 25, 1999)
(No. 99-699).
66. Dale v. Boy Scouts of America, 734 A.2d 1196, 1205 (N.J. 1999), petition for cert.
filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3292 (U.S. Oct. 25, 1999) (No. 99-699).
67. Id. at 1223.
68. Id. at 1225.
69. Id. at 1228.
70. Id. at 1229.
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to portions of the Scout Oath7l and Scout Law,72 and consequently
would not admit homosexual activists as adult members or leaders.
The Dale Courts must have thought that the only way they could
balance the interests and reach the result they wanted to reach was to
find an interest of the Boy Scouts that might be involved in the case,
as in Roberts where the Court declared that the Jaycees might be
forced to change their creed were they forced to admit women. 73 In
their haste to reach such a conclusion and familiarize their case with
Roberts, the Dale Courts ignored evidence as to how the Boy Scouts
would actually be affected by such an application of the public accom-
modation statute. Notwithstanding evidence that the Boy Scouts
were seeking to do more than merely exclude a member who might
force them to change their creed, the New Jersey Supreme Court pro-
ceeded to analyze the issue by ignoring the impact of compelling
Dale's reinstatement, as they analyzed the issue as if Dale were
merely a member of the Boy Scouts, not a leader.74
Even James Dale himself stated that he admired the purposes for
which the Boy Scouts stand-"teaching young people outdoor and
camping skills, developing their leadership abilities and sense of com-
munity responsibility."7 5 Despite all such indications that the Boy
Scouts sought to exclude Dale as a leader because his view on homo-
sexuality did not comply with those BSA required of its leaders, the
New Jersey Court justified its position by stating "Boy Scouts per-
ceived Dale's membership as interfering with its views on 'the moral-
ity of homosexual conduct.'" 7 6 One can only wonder why the Court
often ignored, or at the least significantly undermined, the fact that
Dale was actually seeking to be a Boy Scout leader, a position that
was to be held with knowledge of a person's status as being quite pos-
sibly the only role model for some Scouts.7 7 Clearly, the Scouts were
seeking to prevent the teaching of moral values in their organization
by someone holding values inimical to those held by the Boy Scouts,
71. The Scout Oath states in part, "On my honor I will do my best to do my duty to
God and my country and to obey the Scout Law; to help other people at all times;
to keep myself physically strong, mentally awake, and morally straight." Wn-
LIAm BILL HILLCOURT, THE OFFIcIAL Boy SCOUT HANDBOOK 27 (9th ed. 1979) (em-
phasis added).
72. "A Scout is Trustworthy, Loyal, Helpful, Friendly, Courteous, Kind, Obedient,
Cheerful, Thrifty, Brave, Clean and Reverent." HimLcoURT, supra note 71, at 31
(emphasis added).
73. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 627-28 (1984).
74. Id. at 1225.
75. Dale v. Boy Scouts of America, 734 A.2d 1196, 1225 (N.J. 1999), petition for cert.
filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3292 (U.S. Oct. 25, 1999) (No. 99-699).
76. Id. at 1226 (emphasis supplied).
77. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
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not just to exclude unpopular members.7 8 In other words, the Scouts'
purpose is tied to the advancement of beliefs and ideas that might be
significantly disrupted if forced to implement "non-discriminatory"
membership policies.7 9
The New Jersey Supreme Court also noted and relied upon the fact
that the Boy Scouts is not very selective in its membership, and rea-
soned that since the Boy Scouts solicits members from the public at
large, their claim of expressive association must fall outside the ambit
of Roberts protection.SO Basically, the Dale Courts sought to imple-
ment one of the patent ambiguities in the United States Supreme
Court's opinion in Roberts. The Dale Courts focused on a few of the
factors delineated by Justice Brennan (size and selectivity) and noted
that since the Boy Scouts is a large group with members nationwide,
and is not very selective in soliciting members, it must be the type of
group referenced in Roberts, whose freedom of association must be
outweighed by the interests of the state in eradicating discrimination.
However, the Dale Courts conveniently did not address whether the
Roberts list was to be exhaustive, nor did they even consider all of the
factors listed in Justice Brennan's opinion.
One problem with each of the Dale Courts' analysis is that both
completely ignore the thrust of the Roberts trilogy altogether, espe-
cially the Supreme Court's latest pronouncements in New York State
Club Ass'n. One consistent theme, articulated by the Court in each
case in the trilogy was that the accommodations laws as applied to the
groups in the respective cases would not cause the groups "'to aban-
don or alter' any activities protected by the First Amendment,"81
would not impose restrictions upon "the organization's ability to ex-
clude individuals with ideologies or philosophies different from those
of its existing members,"8 2 or would not "impede the organization[s]
78. The Boy Scouts have acknowledged that the issue of whether homosexual con-
duct is moral or immoral is controversial, and that many people of good will be-
lieve that the Boy Scout's position is misguided. However, the Boy Scouts is of
the position that such controversial questions of personal sexuality are best
tested and resolved within the private marketplace of ideas. "We can respect the
idea of gay men and lesbians not to have traditional morality imposed upon them.
By the same token, we ask that a contrary morality not be forced upon private
associations like Boy Scouts, at the expense of First Amendment freedoms of
Speech and Association." Petition for Certiorari at 28-29, Dale v. Boy Scouts of
America, (U.S. Oct. 25, 1999) (No. 99-699).
79. See supra notes 11-40 and accompanying text.
80. See Dale v. Boy Scouts of America, 734 A.2d 1196, 1219-28 (N.J. 1999), petition
for cert. filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3292 (U.S. Oct. 25, 1999) (No. 99-699).
81. New York State Club Ass'n, 487 U.S. 1, 13 (1988); see also Roberts v. United
States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984); Board of Dirs. of Rotary Intl v. Rotary
Club 431 U.S. 537, 54849 (1987).
82. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 627.
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... [from] disseminat[ing their] preferred views."8 3 Not only does the
application of the statute against the Boy Scouts run afoul of all of
these caveats to the rules in the Roberts trilogy, it also forces the asso-
ciation to propound a message entirely inconsistent with its purpose
and viewpoints, as well as creating the impression that it now ap-
proves of homosexuality after nearly 100 years of avowed disapproval.
In other words, the application of the statutes against the Boy Scouts
violates not only its rights of expressive association, but also its free
speech rights.
The Boy Scouts has taken the position that homosexuality is incon-
sistent with the provisions in the Scout Law and Scout Oath which
provide that the scout must be "morally straight" and "clean."8 4 The
organization has issued written policy statements confirming this as
its position since at least 1978, as recognized (and later ignored in the
record) by the Dale Courts.8 5 Furthermore, anyone who has ever been
a member or attended a meeting of the Boy Scouts knows that prior to
every troop meeting the scout must stand at attention and recite the
Scout Oath and the Scout Law. Therefore, the interpretation given to
these distinct provisions of the Scout Law by the organization itself
should be deemed to, if nothing else, represent the philosophy of the
organization as according to these two provisions in the respective
creeds.
The New Jersey Courts have compelled the Boy Scouts to admit a
leader who has openly and actively participated in demonstrations
contrary to the organization's own view on homosexuality.8 6 Dale's
views are also contrary to the Boy Scouts' interpretation of the Scout
Law and Scout Oath, which brings and keeps the scouts together. The
State of New Jersey has in effect imposed a restriction on the "organi-
zation's ability to exclude individuals with ideologies or philosophies
different from those of its existing members."8 7 Moreover, it would
appear as if the Boy Scouts has suddenly been forced to alter its poli-
cies regarding homosexuality.
As previously indicated, the Boy Scouts essentially sought to ex-
clude an individual who had ideologies and philosophies different from
83. Id.
84. See Dale v. Boy Scouts of America, 734 A.2d 1196, 1202 (N.J. 1999), petition for
cert. filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3292 (U.S. Oct. 25, 1999) (No. 99-699).
85. See id. at 1216.
86. Dale, by his own description, is a sexually active homosexual and was
prominent in gay rights causes at Rutgers University. He has stated
publicly that he disagrees with [the Boy Scouts] moral position against
homosexual conduct and that he 'owes it to the organization to point out
to them how bad and wrong this policy is.
Petition for Certiorari at 14-15, Dale v. Boy Scouts of America (U.S. Oct. 25,
1999) (No. 99-699).
87. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 627.
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those of the organization itself. Therefore, it is clear that the Dale
case is not directly within the ambit of the Roberts analysis, but in-
stead falls within the exception consistently recognized throughout
the trilogy. Basing its decision on the fact that the position against
homosexuality is not what brought the Boy Scouts together, the New
Jersey appellate court noted that the "anti-homosexuality" view was
not the collective view of the members of the organization.8 8 The prob-
lem with this approach is that the Supreme Court has never required
that a policy in an organization be the collective view of its members
in order to be entitled to constitutional protection. Rather it has only
required that the policy at issue be the view of the organization itself.
There is no question that the Boy Scouts of America believes homosex-
uality is contrary to its own Scout Oath and Scout Law. The fact that
there may be some things over which individual members of the group
disagree does not mean that the organization cannot take a stance on
that particular issue.
Courts may, as did the Dale Courts, focus on the fact that there
may be members of the Boy Scouts who hold views contrary to those of
the organization, especially on issues as controversial as homosexual-
ity. Taking this proposition as far as the New Jersey Supreme Court,
and claiming that because a view is not the collective view of all the
members of the group that it therefore must not be a central purpose
of the group itself, turns the constitution on its head. First of all, the
fact that a member or small subset of a group does not agree with a
position taken by organization does not in and of itself obviate the po-
sition taken by the organization on that issue. The members with the
contrary view can always exercise their right "not to associate" and
form their own organization. Furthermore, just because those attend-
ing the meeting chose to attend and adhere to the views of the Boy
Scouts, or at least to remain silent about their own views, a court can
not justifiably infringe the rights of that organization. Even if some-
one wants to join, but does not want to endorse the same view as the
group, the group should not be compelled to endorse the view of the
dissenter, especially when the dissenter has actively protested in the
same community against the stance taken by the group itself.s9
The Supreme Court has recognized that "a narrow, succinctly ar-
ticulable message is not a condition of constitutional protection."90
However, even if this were a requirement, the position taken by the
Boy Scouts would still be protected since its position is arguably suc-
cinct, articulable, and clear. The New Jersey Supreme Court reasoned
88. Dale v. Boy Scouts of America, 734 A.2d 1196, 1223-24 (N.J. 1999), petition for
cert. filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3292 (U.S. Oct. 25, 1999) (No. 99-699).
89. See supra notes 78, 86.
90. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557, 569
(1995).
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that since not all of the scout leaders and scouts adhered to the organi-
zation's viewpoint on homosexuality, the Boy Scouts could not argue
that its purpose was to exclude individuals who do not share the views
that the club's members wished to promote. 9 ' However, the court did
not address the exclusion of leaders who do not share the views that
the organization itself wishes to propound, and by not doing so the
court was clearly mistaken. By reasoning that not all of the members
held the same view, and therefore that the message was not articul-
able by the Boy Scouts, the court effectively provided the Boy Scouts
with a new policy it must adhere to under the state anti-discrimina-
tion law. In this regard, Dale rewrites years of First Amendment ju-
risprudence with one swift stroke of the pen by suddenly requiring
constitutional protections to be forfeited when a speaker wishes to
combine multifarious voices. Such a decision cannot withstand consti-
tutional scrutiny.
Second, by imposing a requirement that the view of the organiza-
tion must necessarily be the collective view of all the members, the
court effectively limits the rights of a large group to express any view
at all. It will be unequivocally difficult for a group the size of the Boy
Scouts to take a stance on any issue of public significance because
there may always be a member somewhere that holds an opinion dif-
ferent from that of the organization. The Supreme Court has noted,
however, that a "speaker does not forfeit constitutional protection sim-
ply by combining multifarious voices."92 The fact that the Boy Scouts
have allowed some people to join who may hold views opposite those of
the organization does not mean that the organization cannot express
and stand behind its own ideas. The problem with admitting Mr. Dale
was not that he held opposite viewpoints, but that he was a local
leader in homosexual activist groups that endorsed philosophies dif-
ferent from those of the Boy Scouts. 93 The Boy Scouts should be al-
lowed "creation of [its] voice"94 and to submit to the marketplace of
ideas its own positions on controversial issues such as homosexuality.
By compelling a group exercising expressive association, such as
the Boy Scouts, to admit members with such different philosophies,
the court goes far beyond infringing the right of expressive associa-
tion. The court essentially compels the Boy Scouts to propound, albeit
symbolically, a particular point of view with which it disagrees. In
other words, not only has the group been forced to admit members
with a "different philosophy," but its has also been compelled to pub-
91. See Dale v. Boy Scouts of America, 734 A.2d 1196, 1223-24 (N.J. 1999), petition
for cert. filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3292 (U.S. Oct. 25, 1999) (No. 99-699).
92. See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569.
93. See supra note 86.
94. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 633 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
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licly endorse a viewpoint with which it disagrees. 9 5 For years, the
Supreme Court has said that this is something that a state cannot
constitutionally do, at least not without first satisfying a strict scru-
tiny analysis.
The Supreme Court has recognized that "[slymbolism is a primi-
tive, but effective way of communicating ideas."9 6 Compelling the Boy
Scouts to admit an individual, such as a homosexual activist, who has
openly and actively advocated an adverse viewpoint on a controversial
issue, clearly compels the Boy Scouts to symbolically agree with ideas
that individual has been actively endorsing. However, the New Jersey
Supreme Court contended otherwise. 97 Since the Boy Scouts has had
a constant stance against homosexuality, the only inference that can
be drawn when it admits an individual who has openly and actively
protested that position is that the Boy Scouts no longer adheres to its
views, especially when that person is admitted as a leader. In es-
sence, by forcing the Boy Scouts to admit Dale, not only as a scout but
also as a leader, New Jersey has forced the Boy Scouts to symbolically
endorse the position that homosexuality is commonplace in today's so-
ciety and that it in no way conflicts with the Scout Oath or the Scout
Law. That, however, was not the actual position of the Boy Scouts.
This logic can be taken a step further. The Boy Scouts has openly
declared that leaders are viewed as role models, and Mr. Dale has ac-
knowledged as much.9 8 By being forced to admit a homosexual ac-
tivist as a leader, the Boy Scouts opens itself up to the public
interpreting this action as its tacit approval of homosexuality. It ap-
pears that by admitting Dale as a leader, the Boy Scouts is admitting
that Dale is viewed as a sufficient role model for younger Scouts.9 9
Therefore, the message sent by the Boy Scouts has been altered not
95. Such an approach directly contravenes the language of Justice Jackson in West
Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943), where he
stated that "[i]f there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is
that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force to citizens to confess by
word or act their faith therein." When the state applies these statutes to the Boy
Scouts, it certainly compels it to "confess by... act their faith" in the position
taken by the State that homosexuals are entitled to heightened protection. This
thereby conveys to the public that it no longer looks with disfavor upon that sex-
ual orientation.
96. West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632 (1943).
97. See Dale v. Boy Scouts of America, 734 A-2d 1196, 1229 (N.J. 1999), petition for
cert. filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3292 (U.S. Oct. 25, 1999) (No. 99-699). The court stated
"We reject the notion that Dale's presence in the organization is symbolic of Boy
Scouts' endorsement of homosexuality." Id. The Court went on to state that "re-
instatement of Dale does not compel Boy Scouts to express any message." Id.
98. See Petition for Certiorari at 16, Dale v. Boy Scouts of America (U.S. Oct. 25,
1999) (No. 99-699) ("Dale acknowledges that the Scoutmaster serves as a 'role
model for the younger Scouts and as a counselor to the older Scouts.'").
99. See supra notes 11-40 and accompanying text.
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only to the enrolled Scouts, but also to the public at large from which
it solicits membership. In other words, not only has speech within the
organization been altered, but the organization's speech within the
community has also been altered. Such considerations notwithstand-
ing, the New Jersey Supreme Court concluded, "the reinstatement of
Dale does not compel Boy Scouts to express any message,"100 and "on
these facts, we do not find forced speech."' 01
The Supreme Court has consistently held that such "compelled
speech" circumvents the protections provided by the First Amend-
ment. In Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission,10 2
the Court invalidated coerced access to the private utility's bill and
newsletter because the utility "may be forced either to appear to agree
with [the intruding leaflet] or to respond."' 03 The Court also held that
if "the government [were] freely able to compel ... speakers to pro-
pound . . . messages with which they disagree, . . . protection [of
speech] would be empty, for the government could require speakers to
affirm in one breath that which they deny in the next."10 4 Nine years
later, the Court in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisex-
ual Group'0 5 noted that when "dissemination of a view contrary to
one's own is forced upon a speaker intimately connected with the com-
munication advanced, the speaker's right to autonomy over the
message is compromised." 06 The Hurley Court concluded that "it
boils down to the choice of a speaker not to propound a particular
point of view, and that choice is presumed to lie beyond the govern-
ment's power to control."' 0 7 Effectively, by applying the Law Against
Discrimination against the Boys Scouts as in Dale, New Jersey has
eviscerated the Boy Scouts' freedom of speech and has compromised
the Boy Scouts' autonomy over the message it sends to Scouts and to
the public. The Boy Scouts, and only the Boy Scouts, should be given
the choice to propound the view it wishes to send. Since the statute
struck down in Hurley was the Massachusetts version of the statute
challenged in Dale, the results should also have been the same.
Towards the end of its unanimous opinion in Hurley, the Court fo-
cuses on its opinion in New York State Club Ass'n, and notes that in
that case it recognized that the state did not prohibit exclusion of
those views at odds with positions espoused by general club members.
The Court noted that although the clubs in that case provided public
100. Dale v. Boy Scouts of America, 734 A.2d 1196, 1229 (N.J. 1999), petition for cert.
filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3292 (U.S. Oct. 25, 1999) (No. 99-699).
101. Id.
102. 475 U.S. 1 (1986) (plurality opinion).
103. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 475 U.S. at 15 (1986).
104. Id. at 16.
105. 515 U.S. 557 (1995)
106. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 576.
107. Id. at 575.
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benefits to which a state could ensure equal access, the clubs were also
engaged in expressive activities. But the Court correctly pointed out
that the compelled access did not trespass on the organization's
message itself. The Court then noted that "[i]f we were to analyze
[Hurley] strictly along those lines, GLIB would lose." The Court pro-
nounced that
Assuming the parade to be large enough and a source of benefits (apart from
its expression) that would generally justify a mandated access provision,
GLIB could nonetheless be refused admission as an expressive contingent
with its own message just as readily as a private club could exclude an appli-
cant whose manifest views were at odds with a position taken by the club's
existing members.1 08
It would seem that the Hurley Court did all of the work for the Dale
Courts. However the New Jersey Supreme Court saw fit to ignore the
Supreme Court's guidance in Hurley. Mr. Dale's views were not only
at odds with the views of some of the club's members, but also at odds
with the views of the club itself and the club should have been allowed
to exclude him.
The Dale Courts struggled with the Hurley argument urged upon
them by the Boy Scouts, and then attempted to distinguish Hurley.
The New Jersey Appellate Court did so on the grounds that "both the
parade and GLIB's participation [in Hurley] were pure forms of
speech."'10 9 The New Jersey Supreme Court agreed, concluding that
"Boy Scout leadership is not a form of 'pure speech' akin to a
parade."' 1 0 Both courts noted that the public accommodation law
mandated only access to membership in the Boy Scouts, reasoning
that it did "not attempt, directly or indirectly, to hamper [the Boy
Scouts ability to carry out these activities or express its views"11 1 and
that "permitting Dale to remain in a leadership position in no way
prevents [the Boy Scouts] from invoking its rights as a private speaker
to shape its expression by speaking on one subject while remaining
silent on another."112 The only classification one can make of such
reasoning in Dale is that it is flat wrong. The Dale Courts assume
that the Boy Scouts' First Amendment rights are not at issue when
the altered message is implicitly conveyed by example, rather than
verbal articulation or by some sign or press release. However, this is
108. Id. at 580-81.
109. Dale v. Boy Scouts of America, 706 A2d 270,293 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998),
afftd, 734 A.2d 1196 (N.J. 1999), and petition for cert. filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3292
(U.S. Oct. 25, 1999) (No. 99-699).
110. Dale v. Boy Scouts of America, 734 A.2d 1196, 1229 (N.J. 1999), petition for cert.
filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3292 (U.S. Oct. 25, 1999) (No. 99-699).
111. Dale v. Boy Scouts of America, 706 A.2d 270, 293 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998),
affd, 734 A-2d 1196 (N.J. 1999), and petition for cert. filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3292
(U.S. Oct. 25, 1999) (No. 99-699).
112. Dale v. Boy Scouts of America, 734 A.2d 1196, 1229 (N.J. 1999), petition for cert.
filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3292 (U.S. Oct. 25, 1999) (No. 99-699).
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simply not the case because the Boy Scouts has been inhibited in ex-
pressing its own views by simultaneously being forced to endorse the
contrary views of another, and the Boy Scouts' speaker autonomy has
been significantly compromised.11s Put another way, admitting Dale
may have no effect on the Boy Scouts ability to speak or articulate a
message, but by compelling Boy Scouts to accept Dale's application,
New Jersey has compelled Boy Scouts to symbolically propound a
message with which it disagrees.
The Dale Courts had to have been aware of the imposition on the
Scouts' ability to express its message. There is no question that the
New Jersey Supreme Court was aware of the Boy Scouts' Scoutmaster
Handbook and the issues discussed therein, as the Court cites por-
tions of the Handbook in its opinion. 1 ' 4 Furthermore, the Supreme
Court of New Jersey points out that Dale was denied membership be-
cause his application did not comply with the organization's guidelines
for leadership.115 Despite this acknowledgement that Dale was essen-
tially applying to be a Boy Scout leader,1 ' 6 the New Jersey Supreme
Court continuously analyzed the issue from the perspective of a denial
of Dale's membership and inclusion in the organization. The court
failed to appreciate what the issue really entailed, a denial by the Boy
Scouts' of a leadership position to someone holding views opposite of
those the organization wished to express."i7 Such a position com-
pletely undermines the realities of the situation, wherein the respon-
sibility for inculcating values and other aspects of scouting is
entrusted to the Scoutmaster, the position for which Dale applied.l18
By ignoring reality, the New Jersey Courts forced the Scouts to pro-
pound a message they would rather not send to members and the pub-
lic at large.
When the New Jersey Supreme Court did acknowledge that Dale
was applying to be a leader, it merely explained that it rejected the
notion that "Dale's presence in the organization is symbolic of Boy
Scouts' endorsement of homosexuality. On these facts, we do not find
forced speech.""i 9 However, the court provided very little explanation
for its position, despite its earlier acknowledgement that a leadership
position could involve expressive activities.120 By taking such an ap-
113. See supra notes 92-108 and accompanying text.
114. Dale v. Boy Scouts of America, 734 A.2d 1196, 1203 (N.J. 1999), petition for cert.
filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3292 (U.S. Oct. 25, 1999) (No. 99-699).
115. Id. at 1205 (emphasis supplied).
116. Id. at 1225.
117. Id.
118. See Petition for Certiorari at 4, Dale v. Boy Scouts of America, (U.S. Oct. 25,
1999) (No. 99-699).
119. Dale v. Boy Scouts of America, 734 A.2d 1196, 1229 (N.J. 1999), petition for cert.
filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3292 (U.S. Oct. 25, 1999) (No. 99-699).
120. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
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proach, it must have been less difficult for the court to reach the result
it desired. In reaching such a result, the Boy Scouts' First Amend-
ment rights were swept under the doormat.
The bottom line is that whether the Boy Scouts' stand on homosex-
uality is fundamental to the organization's creation is basically irrele-
vant and, consequently the reasoning of Dale is entirely inconsistent
with the Supreme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence. The Boy
Scouts are entitled to profess what they believe, whether or not every
member of the group agrees. Consequently, the application of the
statute against the group violates its First Amendment rights. Recall
that for the state to justify the intrusion, they must be able to deline-
ate a compelling interest. In Dale the New Jersey Supreme Court
makes a valiant attempt to delineate such an interest, but their analy-
sis is off the mark as far as the law is concerned. The court stated,
"[ilt is unquestionably a compelling interest of this State to eliminate
the destructive consequences of discrimination from our society."12
1 It
therefore found a compelling interest for New Jersey to "eradicate dis-
crimination."122 However, the United States Supreme Court has
never recognized a compelling interest of such breadth, and Dale is
simply not a case where the Court should do so, because it fits every
exception to any rule that may suggest it might have been the proper
case.
B. The Compelling Interest Analysis
As indicated earlier, cases such as Dale, and those in the Roberts
trilogy, indicate the tension between freedom (the right of association)
and equality (no discrimination).12 3 The fact that the Supreme Court
has adhered to the view that the right of freedom of expressive associ-
ation is not absolute, however, properly balances these two interests
in cases such as Dale. The Court has made clear that the State may
overcome invocations of the "right to discriminate" by delineating a
compelling interest. The following section of this article will examine
the errors made by the Dale Courts in applying the compelling inter-
est analysis.
The Dale Courts misapplied the compelling interest test for numer-
ous reasons, all of which alone might be enough to justify the conclu-
sion that the court erroneously compelled the Boy Scouts to reinstate
Dale. The fact that there are so many errors in the analysis of Dale
121. Dale v. Boy Scouts of America, 734 A.2d 1196, 1227 (N.J. 1999), petition for cert.
filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3292 (U.S. Oct. 25, 1999) (No. 99-699).
122. Id. at 1228. The court also noted "New Jersey has always been in the vanguard
in the fight to eradicate the cancer of unlawful discrimination of all types from
our society." Id. at (quoting Peper v. Princeton Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 389 A.2d
465, 478 (N.J. 1978)).
123. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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indicates just how hard the New Jersey Courts tried to avoid running
afoul of the Constitution, but in each attempt Dale runs afoul of not
only the Constitution, but also logic. First, the Dale courts trespass
upon the First Amendment rights delineated in the previous portion of
this article without adequate justification. The Supreme Court has
never recognized an interest in "eradicating discrimination" as broad
as the interest relied upon by the Dale Courts to justify infringement
of First Amendment rights.124 Additionally, Dale finds an interest
compelling enough to trump a party's constitutional rights but not
compelling enough to trump the state's own discriminatory policies.i 25
Finally, the Dale Court distinguishes Hurley, a case in which the
United States Supreme Court all but assumed away the possibility
that there may be a compelling interest in eradicating discrimination
against homosexuals.126 The bottom line is that the Dale Courts
erred in finding a compelling interest because in its haste to do so, the
courts must have been aware that the interest for which they were
searching was nonexistent.
The New Jersey Supreme Court claimed that the state's compel-
ling interest in eradicating discrimination was enough to justify intru-
sion upon the Boy Scouts' rights of expressive association. 127 The
problem is that to survive the heightened scrutiny to which such viola-
tions of a party's constitutional rights must be subjected, the state
must show that the group sought to be protected by application of the
statute is an inherently suspect class, and that therefore the state's
interest in eradicating discrimination against that group is compel-
ling. Despite a valiant effort to protect homosexuals, the Dale opinion
did not correctly apply the compelling interest standard to the New
Jersey statute, and when the correct standard is applied, the statute
cannot survive the heightened scrutiny under which it should have
ultimately been examined.
The United States Supreme Court has never found a compelling
interest in eradicating discrimination "across the board," as found in
Dale. The Supreme Court has found compelling interests in eradicat-
ing discrimination for certain groups.128 Homosexuals, however, have
never been protected as such a "suspect class." The Court has allowed
the governments to override individual constitutional rights when dis-
crimination against such classes has been involved because the
124. See infra notes 134-39 and accompanying text.
125. See infra notes 140-48 and accompanying text.
126. See infra notes 149-59 and accompanying text
127. See Dale v. Boy Scouts of America, 734 A.2d 1196, 1228 (N.J. 1999), petition for
cert. filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3292 (U.S. Oct. 25, 1999) (No. 99-699).
128. The groups are race, alienage, and national origin; illegitimacy and gender are
also suspect classes, but are not yet classes that give rise to a full-fledged "com-
pelling interest" analysis. See generally Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677,
681 nn.7-9 (1973) (plurality opinion).
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classes have what the Court has determined to be indicia of "suspect-
ness." Such indicia include findings that the class has been saddled
with disabilities, being subject to purposeful unequal treatment, and
the class having been relegated to a position of political powerless-
ness.129 As a class, homosexuals cannot satisfy the foregoing "tests"
or indicia, and therefore the interest of New Jersey in eradicating dis-
crimination on the basis of sexual orientation is less than compelling.
The most obvious indicator that homosexuals do not meet the
Supreme Court's indicia of a suspect class is that it could not seriously
be argued that homosexuals are politically powerless. First of all,
homosexuals as a group have managed to persuade the New Jersey
Legislature to amend the public accommodation law to include sexual
orientation.130 Also, New Jersey is not the only state in which homo-
sexuals have managed to flex their political muscles. Homosexuals
have managed to get statutes and ordinances passed in other states
protecting them from discrimination.13' Also, the class has not been
shown to have been saddled with disabilities or subject to such harsh
and purposeful treatment, at least not enough to qualify them as a
suspect class. All in all, the group is not a suspect class and the
Supreme Court's indicia of a suspect class cannot be met. Conse-
quently, the constitutional rights of the Boy Scouts should survive the
attempt by New Jersey to apply the statute since the state cannot set
forth a compelling interest for infringing the Boy Scouts' constitu-
tional rights. The Dale Courts must have realized this, because rather
than attempting to justify classifying homosexuals as a suspect class,
the Dale Courts broadened the interest at issue to that of "eliminating
the destructive consequences of discrimination from our society,"'132
and later recharacterized that interest as "a compelling interest in
eliminating discrimination based on sexual orientation."'133
Any court confronted with finding a compelling interest to protect a
certain class of individuals must begin their analysis with Bob Jones
University v. United States.134 Bob Jones involved a private school's
attempt to deny enrollment to African Americans married to people
129. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
130. See Dale v. Boy Scouts of America, 706 A.2d 270, 277-78 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1998), affd, 734 A.2d 1196 (N.J. 1999), and petition for cert. filed, 68
U.S.L.W. 3292 (U.S. Oct. 25, 1999) (No. 99-699). The New Jersey Appellate Court
recognized that the statute was amended after the incident arose between Mr.
Dale and the Boy Scouts, but it justified application of the statute by noting that
the Boy Scouts never contended that the statute was inapplicable. In light of that
oversight by the Boy Scouts, the court went ahead and applied the statute to
compel Dale's membership.
131. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
132. Dale v. Boy Scouts of America, 734 A.2d 1196, 1227 (N.J. 1999), petition for cert.
filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3292 (U.S. Oct. 25, 1999) (No. 99-699).
133. Id. at 1228.
134. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
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outside of their own race. Also involved was a school disciplinary rule
that prohibited interracial dating and marriage. 135 Once the IRS
caught wind of the school's policy, they denied the school tax-exempt
status. The University subsequently filed suit claiming that the de-
nial of the status by the IRS infringed the school's rights under the
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment.13s The Supreme Court up-
held the denial of tax-exempt status because it found a compelling in-
terest in the United States' eradication of racial discrimination.
Consequently, the infringement of the University's rights was
justified.137
The Supreme Court found the necessary compelling interest
evinced by "myriad Acts of Congress and Executive Orders, as well as
every pronouncement of this Court [that] attest[s] a firm national pol-
icy to prohibit racial discrimination in public education."1ss The
Court also reasoned that such a compelling interest justifies the de-
nial of status because were the Court to allow the tax-exempt status,
it would appear as if the United States Government were putting its
imprimatur upon racial discrimination by allowing tax-exempt status
to a school exercising such a policy. The Court added that it "would be
anomalous for the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Branches to
reach conclusions that add up to firm public policy on racial discrimi-
nation, and at the same time have the IRS blissfully ignore what all
three branches of the Federal Government had declared."139 The
Court upheld the governmental interest as compelling and allowed the
denial of tax exempt status to the University, despite the First
Amendment claims by the University.
Bob Jones notwithstanding, the reasoning applied therein cannot
be applied to an application of public accommodation laws as in Dale.
Clearly, there has been no national pronouncement by all three
branches of government that discrimination against homosexuals
should be proscribed. Also, the "imprimatur problem" that concerned
the Bob Jones Court is not present in cases such as Dale. By allowing
clubs to express their message to the public, there is no problem with
the public interpreting the allowance of the discriminatory policy to be
action by the state condoning such discrimination. The state would
merely be allowing a speaker to express its views to the public. In
Dale, that speaker is not the individual members of the Boy Scouts,
but rather the Boy Scouts itself. Since the problems with allowing the
tax exemption to Bob Jones University are not present in allowing the
Boy Scouts' selective membership policies, it follows that eradicating
135. Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 581.
136. See id. at 581-82.
137. See id. at 604.
138. Id. at 593.
139. Id. at 598.
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discrimination against African Americans can qualify as a compelling
governmental interest while eradicating discrimination against homo-
sexuals cannot.
Aside from the fact that homosexuals have never qualified as a sus-
pect class under the Supreme Court's jurisprudence, New Jersey has
other problems reconciling the analysis of Dale with Bob Jones. Bob
Jones relied upon the Supreme Court's hesitancy to allow policies in
contravention of well-settled positions taken by the national govern-
ment. Conversely, the Dale Court seemed to rely on an interest oppo-
site that of state governmental policy since the state itself
discriminates against homosexuals. If the state has a compelling in-
terest in eradicating discrimination against homosexuals as deline-
ated by the New Jersey Supreme Court, it follows that the state of
New Jersey would allow death benefits to be paid to homosexual part-
ners, and that it would also allow homosexuals to marry. Despite the
"compelling interest in eradicating discrimination" used to justify in-
fringement of the Boy Scouts' constitutional rights, the State of New
Jersey has continued to implement its own discriminatory policies
against homosexuals. It follows that the Dale Courts overlooked such
policies and could most likely be forced to withdraw its statement that
there is such an overarching interest in eradicating all such discrimi-
nation if faced with similar issues in the future.
Rutgers Council of AAUP Chapters v. State University of
Rutgers'40 evinces the problems inherent in Dale's reasoning. In
Rutgers, the plaintiffs, as employees of the state, sought health insur-
ance coverage under state employment benefit packages for same sex
domestic partners. The very same appellate court that decided Dale
held that the state was justified in denying the benefits under an ex-
press exception to the Law Against Discrimination.14 l First, the court
addressed the argument that Law Against Discrimination was appli-
cable to the plaintiffs claims and noted that it did not apply because
there was an exception in the statute for state benefit plans.42 The
express exception on the face of the statute turns the "compelling in-
terest" analysis of Dale inside out, and calls into question that bold
statement by the New Jersey Supreme Court that "New Jersey has
always been in the vanguard in the fight to eradicate the cancer of
unlawful discrimination of all types from our society."1 43
Dale held that the state has a compelling interest in eradicating
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.J44 If this is actually
140. 689 A.2d 828 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997).
141. See Rutgers, 689 A.2d at 838.
142. See id. at 832.
143. Dale v. Boy Scouts of America, 734 A.2d at 1196, 1227 (N.J. 1999), petition for
cert. filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3292 (U.S. Oct. 25, 1999) (No. 99-699).
144. Id.
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the case, how could the legislature justify placing an exception in the
public accommodations law expressly allowing the state to discrimi-
nate on a basis which has been foreclosed to everyone else. It cer-
tainly seems that if the state has a compelling interest, it would lead
by example, as the United States Government did in Bob Jones by
issuing proclamations from each branch of government, rather than
implementing discriminatory policies of its own. The Rutgers Court
justified upholding the exception against an equal protection chal-
lenge by stating that "[w]e have not created suspect classifications
where the federal courts have refused to do so, and therefore, [we]
have no reason to view sexual orientation... as deserving of height-
ened scrutiny."1 45 The court then examined the exception under ra-
tional basis review since no suspect class was involved, and upheld the
exception's validity.
The Rutgers Court also discussed the New Jersey marriage stat-
utes during its discussion of the equal protection claims. Rutgers
noted that the statutes consistently spoke of parties to the marriage
as the "man" or the "woman," and that the New Jersey Courts had
made clear that marriage was defined as the union of one man and one
woman. 146 The Court recognized:
[It is not disputed-as the fundamental premise... that a lawful marriage
requires the performance of a ceremonial marriage of two persons of the oppo-
site sex, a male and a female. Despite winds of change, this understanding of
a valid marriage is almost universal. In the matrimonial field the heterosex-
ual union is usually regarded as the only one entitled to legal recognition and
public sanction. There is not the slightest doubt that New Jersey follows the
overwhelming authority. The historic assumption in the application of com-
mon law and statutory strictures relating to marriages is that only persons
who can become "man and wife" have the capacity to enter marriage. -he
pertinent statutes relating to marriages ... do not contain any explicit refer-
ences to a requirement that marriage must be between a man and a woman.
Nevertheless that statutory condition must be extrapolated. It is so strongly
and firmly implied from a full reading of the statutes that a different legisla-
tive intent, one which would sanction a marriage between persons of the same
sex, cannot be fathomed.147
Despite such a discussion not being necessary, the Rutgers Court
seized the opportunity to set the record straight. Yet, just days later
in Dale, the very same appellate court stated that there was a compel-
ling interest in eradicating discrimination against homosexuals, and
the New Jersey Supreme Court ultimately agreed. The only way to
reconcile Rutgers with Dale is to say that in New Jersey, discrimina-
tion will not be tolerated against homosexuals because the state has a
compelling interest in eradicating such discrimination, unless the
145. Rutgers Council of AAUP Chapters v. State Univ. of Rutgers, 689 A.2d 828, 833
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997) (emphasis added).
146. See id. at 834.
147. Id. at 834-35 (citations omitted) (quoting M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1976)).
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state itself opts to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation.
However, if the state is allowed to discriminate against homosexuals,
has the compelling interest delineated and relied upon in Dale not
evaporated?
How can the state possibly maintain that it has an interest compel-
ling enough to override the constitutional rights of the Boy Scouts
when the state itself discriminates on those same grounds upon which
the Boy Scouts seeks to exclude members? The only plausible answer
is that the Dale Courts committed clear error in finding a compelling
interest. Discrimination by the state is arguably even worse than that
sought by the Boy Scouts. The state denies employment benefits to
homosexuals, but maintains that homosexuals should be allowed to
serve as leaders in the Boy Scouts because homosexuals have been
subject to a great deal of past and present discrimination. More im-
portantly, New Jersey has made it abundantly clear that it would
deny to homosexuals the fundamental right to marry,1 4s yet main-
tains that when the Boy Scouts seek to exercise fundamental constitu-
tional rights, there is a compelling interest justifying governmental
interference. The state should not be allowed to speak out of both
sides of its mouth, as it has sought to force the Boy Scouts to do, and
Dale should be overruled on the grounds that there was no compelling
interest in "eradicating discrimination." The effect is that New Jersey
appears to be telling its citizens to "do as I say, not as I do."
Of all the problems with the Dale Courts' analyses, the most fatal
appears upon reexamination of Hurley and Roberts. First of all, the
balancing test enunciated by Justice Brennan in Roberts cannot be
satisfied when applied to the competing interests in Dale. Further-
more, in addition to Roberts, the Supreme Court was given the oppor-
tunity in Hurley to enunciate the compelling interest employed by the
Dale Courts. However, not only did the Court not do so, it did not even
address the arguments urged upon it by the Gay-Lesbian Group of
Boston that there was a substantial governmental interest in compel-
ling the parade to accept the homosexual group. 14 9 Logically, if the
Supreme Court thought there could be a compelling interest in eradi-
cating discrimination against homosexuals, it would have at least ad-
dressed the "substantial interest" argument urged upon it in Hurley.
However, the Court did not even address the issue and stated that
even if it were to analyze the statute as if it were not compelling the
veterans' group to change it message, the gay group would still lose.
In other words, the Supreme Court has all but explicitly stated that
there is no compelling interest that could justify forcing the Boy
Scouts to accept Dale's application for leadership because there is not
148. See supra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
149. See Brief of Respondent at 22, Hurley v. Irish-American Gay Group of Boston,
515 U.S. 557 (1995) (No. 94-749).
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even a substantial interest which could be found to force the Court to
address the issue in Hurley.
Dale relied upon Roberts for its justification of the infringement of
First Amendment freedoms.150 The problem with such a reliance is
that Roberts's balancing test, when applied to Dale, strikes the bal-
ance clearly in favor of the Boy Scouts' rights of expressive associa-
tion. In Roberts, it was not contended that the public accommodation
law was applied for the purpose of hampering the Jaycees' ability to
express its views.1 51 However, this is the contention of the Boy Scouts
in Dale, and that contention must be seriously considered while evalu-
ating the infringement of the Boy Scouts' right of expressive associa-
tion. If seriously considered, the scales are tipped in favor of the Boy
Scouts. 1 5 2
Justice Brennan noted in Roberts that there were many members
of the business community that were members of the Jaycees and that
membership in the organization would be beneficial to women because
they could form many business contacts essential to succeeding in the
business community while simultaneously removing barriers to eco-
nomic advancement.isa Brennan balanced those interests pro-
pounded by Minnesota against the Jaycees' right to exclude women
because it might force them to take different positions on public is-
sues. Justice Brennan then concluded that since there was no evi-
dence the Jaycees would be forced to alter their message, and since
the Jaycees' argument was based on assumption and speculation, that
the state's interest outweighed the assumed interest of the Jaycees.154
The very same balancing test indicates that the Boy Scouts are
protected from application of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimina-
tion. The interest of the state in compelling membership to the Boy
Scouts does not carry with it the ability to make contacts and remove
disadvantages as in Roberts. Such an argument may have been more
persuasive, although not persuasive enough, if the argument were
urged by an actual scout.15 5 However, in Dale, such an argument is
being urged upon the courts by an applicant for adult membership
which would allow him to be a volunteer leader, which basically
amounts to a claim that his "right to volunteer" trumps the organiza-
tion's constitutional rights. Since the interest of the state is signifi-
cantly lower in Dale than the interests articulated in Roberts, the
interest is not compelling and should not survive application of the
150. Dale v. Boy Scouts of America, 706 A.2d 270, 285-87 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1998), afftd, 734 A.2d 1196 (N.J. 1999), and petition for cert. filed, 68 U.S.L.W.
3292 (U.S. Oct. 25, 1999) (No. 99-699).
151. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 624 (1984).
152. See supra notes 11-37 and accompanying text.
153. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 626.
154. See id. at 627-28.
155. See Curran v. Mount Diablo Council, 952 P.2d 218 (Cal. 1998).
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balancing test because the Boy Scouts' interest in excluding Dale is
certainly higher than the interest of the Jaycees in excluding women.
The speculation alluded to by Brennan in Roberts has vanished and is
not present in Dale.
The Boy Scouts has contended that by admitting Dale as a leader
that they will actually be forced to alter their message to the public as
well as to the scouts enrolled in their programs. These facts makes
the Boy Scout's interest more "weighty" in the balancing test than the
Jaycees' interest. Unlike the Jaycees, the Boy Scouts are not basing
their asserted interests on speculation and assumptions, but rather
have produced evidence that the symbolic message that they now ap-
prove of the homosexual lifestyle runs directly contrary to the views
that the Boy Scouts have heretofore expounded to the public and to
enrolled scouts. Therefore, use of the Roberts balancing test makes
clear that Dale unconstitutionally applied the New Jersey public ac-
commodation law against the Boy Scouts.
Having determined that the scales are tipped in favor of the Boy
Scouts in Dale, there is yet one more indication that the Supreme
Court may likely overturn Dale if given the opportunity. Turning once
again to Hurley, it is clear that the Supreme Court has all but ex-
pressly indicated that eradicating discrimination against homosexuals
will not justify infringing constitutional rights of expressive associa-
tion. As indicated previously, the Supreme Court has not as of yet
granted homosexuals the privilege of being a suspect class, 156 and
therefore discrimination against them will probably not give rise to a
compelling governmental interest that might justify overriding an in-
dividual's First Amendment freedoms. Unless homosexuals have sud-
denly became a suspect class, the interests of the Boy Scouts are going
to clearly outweigh the heretofore unarticulated interest of "eradicat-
ing discrimination based on sexual orientation."
In Hurley, the Respondents urged the Supreme Court to accept the
argument that Massachusetts's anti-discrimination law served sub-
stantial governmental interests unrelated to the suppression of ex-
pression.157 The Court did not adopt, nor even address, the
Respondent's proposed test, but rather took the approach that there
was no legitimate interest in "support of applying the Massachusetts
statute.., to expressive activity like the parade."'5 8 The Court clari-
fied its decision by noting that
The statute ... is a piece of protective legislation that announces no purpose
beyond the object both expressed and apparent in its provisions, which is to
prevent any denial of access to (or discriminatory treatment in) public accom-
156. See supra notes 128-39 and accompanying text.
157. See Brief of Respondent at 22, Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual
Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
158. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 578.
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modations on proscribed grounds, including sexual orientation.... When the
law is applied to expressive activity in the way it was done here, its apparent
object is simply to require speakers to modify the content of their expression
to whatever extent beneficiaries of the law choose to alter it with messages of
their own. But, in the absence of some further, legitimate end, this object is
merely to allow exactly what the general rule of speaker autonomy forbids....
While the law is free to promote all sorts of conduct in place of harmful behav-
ior, it is not free to interfere with speech for no better reason than promotion of
an approved message or discouraging a disfavored one, however enlightened
either purpose may strike the government.15 9
The application of the New Jersey statute to the Boy Scouts, as in
Dale, runs directly contrary to the above language in Justice Souter's
opinion for the unanimous Court in Hurley. Compelling the Boy
Scouts to admit Mr. Dale as a member compels the Boy Scouts to alter
their symbolic message on the grounds that the government approves
more of the message that homosexuality is an accepted lifestyle than
it does of the message that people should look upon such a lifestyle
with disfavor. It can be inferred from the unanimous decision in Hur-
ley that every member of the Supreme Court would also look with the
same disfavor upon New Jersey's application of the statute in Dale.
The Court's cautionary language in Hurley is also indicative of the
dangers inherent in the "overapplication" of these public accommoda-
tions statutes. While one cannot take issue with the lofty motives be-
hind the enactment of these statutes, when they are as vigorously
applied as in Dale, they could actually cause more harm than they will
prevent. Such dangers are even more apparent when one notes some
of the readily apparent ramifications of Dale, just a few short months
after being handed down. For instance, one Rhode Island chapter of
the Boy Scouts has had problems with scouts challenging legal action
because of discrimination based on sexual orientation, and has opted
to issue a "don't ask, don't tell" policy.16 0 Some commentators have
taken this to mean that "the Boy Scouts are in retreat. 16 1 Perhaps
that is exactly what organizations such as Boy Scouts should do,
retreat.
The implications of overapplying these public accommodation stat-
utes could quickly be seen should the Boy Scouts decide not to compro-
mise their constitutional rights so easily. Perhaps the National
Headquarters of the Boy Scouts should not issue a "don't ask, don't
tell" policy as their Rhode Island subdivision has done, but perhaps it
should withdraw from the state of New Jersey altogether. Perhaps it
should withdraw from all states that seek to subject them to these
statutes in a manner inapposite the approach taken by other jurisdic-
tions which hold such statutes inapplicable to groups such as the Boy
159. Id. at 579 (emphasis added).
160. Michael Mello, R.L Boy Scouts Issue Gay Policy, AP ONLINE, August 11, 1999,
available in 1999 WL 22032940.
161. Id.
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Scouts. Such an approach would limit the application of such statutes
to the manner most likely intended upon enactment: to limit the appli-
cation to preclude discrimination in places of public accommoda-
tion.'6 2 As indicated earlier, some states, including New Jersey,
engraft certain exceptions right on the face of these statutes. Perhaps
states should add similar exceptions that apply to groups such as the
Boy Scouts. In the event that the Boy Scouts would rather pull out of
New Jersey instead of compromising their rights, such an exception to
the Law Against Discrimination may be closer than some people
would like to think.
The point to be made is that not many people want their children
to grow up in a society where joining a group such as the Boy Scouts is
not an option. Should society seek to rid itself of wrongs such as dis-
crimination by bending constitutional rights as was done in Dale, such
a situation may soon appear. However contemptible some people
might find a policy excluding certain groups from membership in an
organization, the bottom line is that to force the organization to accept
members they would rather exclude directly contravenes that organi-
zation's constitutional rights, except in limited circumstances.' 63 One
can only hope that after Dale, these statutes are carefully drafted and
applied so as not to rid our society of commendable organizations such
as the Boy Scouts.
IV. CONCLUSION
Public accommodation statutes give rise to serious questions of
constitutionality when applied in cases such as Dale. Groups such as
the Boy Scouts have constitutionally protected rights of expressive as-
sociation, as well as free speech, that may in fact give those groups a
constitutionally protected right to discriminate. However, the state
may overcome such a right by delineating a compelling interest. The
problem with Dale, and other cases that will inevitably arise when
dealing with provisions in public accommodation statutes protecting
homosexuals from discrimination, is that the state cannot delineate
an interest that rises to the level of compelling in order to override the
First Amendment freedoms at issue. The fact is that homosexuals
have not been given the protections that come with designation as a
suspect class, and until the Supreme Court takes that step such stat-
utes will not be able to survive strict scrutiny. Furthermore, such a
strict application of these anti-discrimination statutes risks running
162. See generally Welsh v. Boy Scouts of America, 993 F.2d 1267 (7th Cir. 1993);
United States Jaycees v. Richardet, 666 P.2d 1008 (Alaska 1983); United States
Jaycees v. Bloomfield, 434 A.2d 1379 (D.C. 1981); United States Jaycees v. Iowa
Civil Rights Comm'n, 427 N.W.2d 450 (Iowa 1988); United States Jaycees v. Mas-
sachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 463 N.E.2d 1151 (Mass. 1984).
163. See supra note 78.
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organizations such as the Boy Scouts right out of town. In other
words, if states like New Jersey continue to tread on the Constitution
to get their foot in the clubhouse door, the Supreme Court may be
forced to resolve the question. If the Supreme Court ultimately takes
a case such as Dale, the state courts may find the door being slammed
on its foot in an effort to set the record straight and delineate just
what the state can and cannot do. The most appropriate course of ac-
tion for courts confronted with these types of questions are best tested
and resolved within the private marketplace of ideas.164 As the Boy
Scouts have done, courts should "respect the idea of gay men and les-
bians not to have traditional morality imposed upon them. By the
same token, ... a contrary morality [should] not be forced upon pri-
vate organizations like Boy Scouts, at the expense of First Amend-
ment freedom of speech and association."' 6 5
164. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
165. Petition for Certiorari at 28-29, Dale v. Boy Scouts of America (U.S. Oct. 25,
1999) (No. 99-699).
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